While implicit invocation (publish-subscribe) systems have good engineering properties, they are difficult to reason about and to test. Model checking such systems is an attractive alternative. However, it is not clear what kinds of state models are best suited for this. In this paper we propose a structural approach, which factors the model checking problem into two parts: behavior specific to a particular implicit invocation system, and reusable run-time infrastructure that handles event-based communication and delivery policies. The reusable portion is itself structured so that alternative run-time mechanisms may be experimented with.
I1 architectures offer engineering benefits of loose coupling between system components, while retaining the ability to implement semantically rich interactions between them. In particular, it is easy to add new events, register new listeners on existing events, or modify the set of announcers of a given event. Thus implicit invocation systems support the ability to compose and evolve large and complex software systems out of independent components [IO] .
delivery, and variability in the timing of event announcements, the number of possible system executions rapidly becomes combinatorially large. There have been several attempts to develop formal foundations for specifying and reasoning about I1 systems [ l , 2, 7, 5, 61 , and this area remains a fertile one for formal verification. Unfortunately, existing notations and methods are difficult to use in practice by non-formalists, and require considerable proof machinery to carry out.
An attractive alternative to formal reasoning is the use of model checking. A model checker finds bugs in systems by exploring all possible states of an approximating finite state model to search for violations of some desired property (typically described as a temporal logic formula). Model checking has had great success in hardware verification, and is starting to be used by researchers to find errors in software systems [4] .
While model checking is a powerful technique, one of the stumbling blocks to using it is the creation of appropriate finite state models for the systems being checked. Since most software systems are infinite-state, one must first find suitable abstractions that reduce the system to a finite state model, without eliminating the class of errors that one wants to pinpoint.
A related problem is finding a suitable structure for the state model so that properties of interest can be easily expressed in terms of the state machine, and further, so that when errors are found, they can be easily related back to the original system. In general, this abstraction and structuring process is highly system-and domain-specific: techniques for deriving models from one class of software system may be completely inappropriate for another. This means that the person creating a model often has to develop a new set of structures from scratch for each system. However, there is a downside to I1 systems: they are hard to reason about and to test. In particular, given the inherent non-determinism in the order ofevent receipt, delays in event One step towards improving this situation would be to provide generic structured models for certain classes of systems that can be easily tailored to the needs of a particular system within that class. In this paper we do just that for I1 systems. Specifically, we provide a generic implicit-invocation model-checking framework, that identifies the main struc- However, a typical system can generally be described as consisting of the following structural elements: Figure I : Structure of an I1 System Model adopted the following restrictions: all data has a finite range; the event alphabet and the set of components and bindings are fixed at runtime; there is a specified limit on the size of the event queue and on the length of event announcement history maintained by the dispatcher; there is a limit on the size of invocation queues (pending method invocations as a result of event delivery).
A second problem is the construction of the run-time apparatus that glues the components together, mediating their interaction via event announcements. This involves developing state machines that maintain pending event queues, enforce dispatch regimes (correctly modeling non-deterministic aspects of the dispatch), and providing shared variable access. In principle, this part of the modeling process could be done afresh for each system using brute force. Unfortunately modeling I1 systems involves a fair amount of state machinery, and is not trivial to get right. Moreover, once built, it is hard to experiment with alternative run time mechanisms. For example, one might want to investigate the consequences of using a dispatcher in which events could be lost, or one in which causal ordering for events is guaranteed.
In our research we have factored out this second effort, by providing reusable run-time model checkable infrastructure for the run-time mediation. To account for variability in the dispatch mechanisms we provide pluggable state modules that allow a modeler to choose from one of several possible run-time models.
Specifically, we factor the problem into parts, as indicated in Figure I . The user provides a specification of (a) the component methods (as state machines), (b) an optional set of shared variables, (c) the list of events, (d) the event-method bindings, and (e) a model of the environment (or a specification of its behavior). In addition, the user picks the specific dispatch policy (from the options listed in Figure 2) , and the concurrency model (from the options also listed in Figure 2 ). These parts can then be translated into a set of interacting state machine descriptions using a tool that we built. The resulting system is then checked using a commercial model checker. '
BUILDING THE RUN-TIME STATE MODEL
In our approach the run-time infrastructure supporting 11-style communication has two parts: (a) the mechanisms that interact with the components of the system to handle event announcement, event buffering, and method invocation; and (b) the mechanisms that implement event dispatch and event delivery policy. For a particular system the former remains the same, while the latter can be varied to match the I1 system's particular event delivery scheme. Both parts are generated by the translation tool from the user's specification.
In more detail, the first part must provide state machine structures that faithfully model: 0 Event announcements by the system components.
Storage of event announcements by the run-time infrastructure in preparation for dispatch. Event delivery to the system components, after the dispatch mechanism has selected the event(s) for dispatch (described below).
0 Invocation of the methods bound to the delivered events. Invocation acknowledgement, which indicates that a method has completed its execution.
Our state model generation method implements this communication in terms of the following shared state variables (see also Figure 3 ): The second aspect of the run-time infrastructure is the dispatcheddelivery policy pair that is positioned between event announcement acceptance and event delivery notification (see Figure 3 ). This portion of the infrastructure is responsible for immediate announcement acceptance and does not keep track of whether the event delivery notification has been properly processed (the invocation queues take care of that).
The dispatcher state machine performs the role of reading the announcement signals, immediately updating the data structure that reflects the set of pending events (the active events history), and assigning delivery signals as directed by the delivery policy. The delivery policy executes by continuously reading the pending event information from the dispatcher and generating another data structure (the delivery directive) that marks events to be delivered during a particular cycle.
The data structures maintained and shared by dispatcher and delivery policy may vary in complexity, depending on how much information about the set of pending events is required by the delivery policy. The most general mechanism maintains all of the attributes of pending events and also keeps track of the temporal announcement information for each event. We have found that this mechanism is most easily modeled with the aid of distinct announcement signals as described above.
Once the run-time infrastructure has been built as described above, it easy to substitute different dispatchers and delivery policies and examine their effects on the system behavior without changing any other portions of the state model; in many cases interesting behavior can be explored by replacing just the policy module.
EXAMPLE
We illustrate the technique with a simple example, introduced in [9] and elaborated in [5] . The example includes two components: a set and a counter. Elements may be added to or removed from the set. The counter may be incremented or decremented. Elements are addedlremoved from the set upon the receipt of insert(v) or delete(v) events from the environment; when the insertion or deletion is successful (insertion fails if element is in the set already; deletion fails if element is not in the set), the set announces update(ins) or update(de1) events which are dispatched to invoke corresponding increment and decrement events in the counter. The goal is to determine if the system preserves the "invariant" that the counter is equal to the size of the set. Figure 4 shows the state model structure and the shared state variables used for communication. Note that in this case no announcement/delivery adapters are required for Delete and Insert events because they have no arguments and can simply be represented by single binary signals. An appendix to this paper contains additional details of the SMV model, and in particular shows two different delivery policies.
To check the model for properties of interest we use a model checker. In the case of Cadence SMV we can exploit a feature that allows us to assert certain properties of the model, and then use those assumptions in verifying other properties. For example, to avoid buffer overflow in the finite event queues, we assert that the environment will be simply not generate an overflow. We also assert that the environment will eventually stop, in order to verify that even though Counter may get out of sync with the Set contents, it will eventually catch up).2
ConsiderateEnvironment : assert 'Properties are expressed in the logical notation of CTL, using "F' to represent "eventually," "G' to represent "globally," and tilda to represent "not .*' Then the 'consideration' of environment is used to verify that parts of the model depending on this are correct, for example:
using ConsiderateEnvironment prove eventBuffersOk;
The fact that the environment does eventually stop is then used to show that the counter indeed eventually catches up with the set contents:
assert(G F The first property (which is false) illustrates that updates do sometimes fail, while the second generates a counterexample showing that counter value may in fact become negative if (by the whim of the delivery policy) insert events headed for the counter are held up while delete events are allowed through for a number of cycles.
CONCLUSION DISCUSSION
We have outlined an approach to model checking I1 systems that factors out and parameterizes the run-time mechanisms that support component integration. We then illustrated the idea for a simple example.
The more general idea behind the approach is to exploit regularities and known variabilities in architectural structure so that common checking infrastructure can be built once and then used by anyone designing systems in the corresponding architectural style. Not only does this approach reduce the cost of building the models to be checked, but it greatly simplifies the technology since the modeler need only worry about the application-specific aspects of the problem (in this case, the behavior of the components). Naturally, a similar approach could be applied to other architectural styles, with similar gains in cost reduction and ease of use.
One of the drawbacks to such an approach is that because the models are generic and machine-generated, they may be less efficient than hand-crafted models. By "efficient," we mean that they can be represented by a more compact state representation. In some cases, given today's model checking technology, this may be the difference between a tractable and intractable model. Understanding when such fine-tuning and extra effort is required represents an important area of future work. 
